The ERT had a higher frequency of fixations than the rookies in all phases [of the scenario] except the aim/fire phase, when the ERT had fewer fixations to fewer locations than the rookies, indicative of greater focus and concentration as they aimed and fired.
The ERT increasingly directed their attention to the suspects gun hand/arm as the scenario evolved. They increased the percent of fixations to this location from 21 percent in the assessment and early pivot phases to 71 percent during the final two seconds. On hits, the ERT directed 86 percent of their final fixations to this one location, revealing a remarkable degree of focus and concentration under fire. And, the study explains, they had time for a final, undisturbed period of super-concentration that Vickers calls the quiet eye, which has been linked with high performance across many different genres of athletics. In this, their eye remained settled on a defined target location through trigger pull.
The rookies did not show the same funneling of their attention to the assailants gun hand/arm, the study points out. Early on, similar to the ERT, they concentrated a minority of their fixations there. But at the time the suspect aimed and fired, only 33 percent of the rookies fixations were directed there, a modest and inadequate increase. And whatever quiet-eye time they exhibited was significantly lower.
TELL-TALE SACCADE
Perhaps most startling, the officers last abrupt shift of gaze before firing was found to be radically different between the two groups.
The rookies final saccade, especially among those who missed when they fired, occurred at the same time they tried to fixate the target and aim, the study reveals. At that critical moment in the last 500 ms, the rookies in a staggering 82 percent of their tests took their eyes off the assailant and attempted to look at their own gun, trying to find or confirm sight alignment as they aimed. This pulled them out of the gunfight for what turned out to be a significant period of time, Lewinski says. Vickers adds: On a high percentage of their shots, the rookies did not see the assailant as they fired, contributing to inaccurate shooting and the misjudgment of the cell phone as a threat.
About 30 percent of the ERT also looked at their gun, but their timing was different. Most of those gaze-shifts occurred before the officers aimed, followed by the onset of their aim and fixation on the target and firing.
FLAWED TRAINING?
The researchers pose the possibility that the rookies training may have contributed to their poor performance. They were taught pistolcraft similar to how most police officers first learn to shoot a handgun: to focus first on the rear sight, then on the front sight, and finally on the target, aligning all three before pulling the trigger.
This is a very time-consuming process and one that was not successful in this study, Vickers says.
Somewhere across their training, practice, and experience, the successful ERT officers had learned what essentially is a reverse process: Their immediate and predominate focus is on the weapon carried by their attacker. With their gaze concentrated there, they bring their gun up to their line of sight and catch their sights only in their peripheral vision, a subtle sight glimpse, as Lewinski terms it. They have an unconscious kinesthetic sense to know that their gun is up and positioned properly, he says. This is a focus strategy that Olympic shooters use, says Vickers, and it is simpler, faster, and more effective.
As the assailants actual attack got underway, the elite officers were zeroed in on a weapons focus. That is, the ERT officers fixations were not directed to the assailants centre of mass as he pivoted and fired, but to the weapon itself, which he held away from his body until the moment he fired. The ERT tracked the weapon as soon as it was visible, using a series of fixations. Because he was moving rapidly, it was only during the last few milliseconds that his centre mass presented a viable target.
This intense attentiveness to the weapon can have memory implications later on, Lewinski explains. Now we have an empirical study showing why an officer who survives a gunfight may be unable to identify a perpetrators face or recall other important details proximate to the shooting, such as the body position or turning action of the subject.
Now that the study has documented important ways in which expert shooters behave, how can trainers best convey these elite skills to other officers? FSRC plans to do more work with Dr. Vickers to identify answers to that question, Lewinski says. But already, these findings suggest some important changes that will point us in the right direction.
NEXT: What will it take in terms of gaze and attention training to make police firearms skills much greater much faster?
The ERT increasingly directed their attention to the suspects gun hand/arm as the scenario evolved. They increased the percent of fixations to this location from 21 percent in the assessment and early pivot phases to 71 percent during the final two seconds. On hits, the ERT directed 86 percent of their final fixations to this one location, revealing a remarkable degree of focus and concentration under fire. And, the study explains, they had time for a final, undisturbed period of super-concentration that Vickers calls the quiet eye, which has been linked with high performance across many different genres of athletics. In this, their eye remained settled on a defined target location through trigger pull.
The rookies did not show the same funneling of their attention to the assailants gun hand/arm, the study points out. Early on, similar to the ERT, they concentrated a minority of their fixations there. But at the time the suspect aimed and fired, only 33 percent of the rookies fixations were directed there, a modest and inadequate increase. And whatever quiet-eye time they exhibited was significantly lower.
TELL-TALE SACCADE
Perhaps most startling, the officers last abrupt shift of gaze before firing was found to be radically different between the two groups.
The rookies final saccade, especially among those who missed when they fired, occurred at the same time they tried to fixate the target and aim, the study reveals. At that critical moment in the last 500 ms, the rookies in a staggering 82 percent of their tests took their eyes off the assailant and attempted to look at their own gun, trying to find or confirm sight alignment as they aimed. This pulled them out of the gunfight for what turned out to be a significant period of time, Lewinski says. Vickers adds: On a high percentage of their shots, the rookies did not see the assailant as they fired, contributing to inaccurate shooting and the misjudgment of the cell phone as a threat.
About 30 percent of the ERT also looked at their gun, but their timing was different. Most of those gaze-shifts occurred before the officers aimed, followed by the onset of their aim and fixation on the target and firing.
FLAWED TRAINING?
The researchers pose the possibility that the rookies training may have contributed to their poor performance. They were taught pistolcraft similar to how most police officers first learn to shoot a handgun: to focus first on the rear sight, then on the front sight, and finally on the target, aligning all three before pulling the trigger.
This is a very time-consuming process and one that was not successful in this study, Vickers says.
Somewhere across their training, practice, and experience, the successful ERT officers had learned what essentially is a reverse process: Their immediate and predominate focus is on the weapon carried by their attacker. With their gaze concentrated there, they bring their gun up to their line of sight and catch their sights only in their peripheral vision, a subtle sight glimpse, as Lewinski terms it. They have an unconscious kinesthetic sense to know that their gun is up and positioned properly, he says. This is a focus strategy that Olympic shooters use, says Vickers, and it is simpler, faster, and more effective.
As the assailants actual attack got underway, the elite officers were zeroed in on a weapons focus. That is, the ERT officers fixations were not directed to the assailants centre of mass as he pivoted and fired, but to the weapon itself, which he held away from his body until the moment he fired. The ERT tracked the weapon as soon as it was visible, using a series of fixations. Because he was moving rapidly, it was only during the last few milliseconds that his centre mass presented a viable target.
This intense attentiveness to the weapon can have memory implications later on, Lewinski explains. Now we have an empirical study showing why an officer who survives a gunfight may be unable to identify a perpetrators face or recall other important details proximate to the shooting, such as the body position or turning action of the subject.
Now that the study has documented important ways in which expert shooters behave, how can trainers best convey these elite skills to other officers? FSRC plans to do more work with Dr. Vickers to identify answers to that question, Lewinski says. But already, these findings suggest some important changes that will point us in the right direction.
NEXT: What will it take in terms of gaze and attention training to make police firearms skills much greater much faster?